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COMMENT
COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES
IN MASSACHUSETTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

This comment examines Massachusetts' state and federal court
exceptions to the American rule disallowing attorneys' fees. Massa
chusetts follows the American rule with respect to court awarded
attorneys' fees. 1 Under the rule, neither a plaintiff nor a defendant
has an inherent right to receive attorneys' fees from the losing
party in a court dispute. 2 The American rule is a departure from
the English tradition of allowing counsel fees to a successful liti
gant. 3
The American departure from the English rule can be traced
to the colonists' view of attorneys. The honorable distinction associ
ated with the legal profession was always matched in popular lore
by the lawyer's reputation for sharpness and greedy manipulation
of technicality to oppress the weak and ignorant. 4 The colonists saw
the English system as favoring the wealthy over the poor and un
duly burdening the losing party.5 This view of the English system
1. See, e.g., Lincoln St. Realty Co. v. Green, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 670, 373
N.E.2d 1172 (1978).
2. S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 12:3, at 463-64 (1973). Of the fifty states,
only Alaska does not follow the American rule. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973).
For more information on the American rule, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849
(1929); Note, Attorneys' Fees, Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REv. 1216 (1967).
3. See S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:7 at 479. In England, the Statute of
Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1, (1275), provided for costs including counsel fees to suc
cessful plaintiffs in litigation. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 853. Since 1607, English
courts have been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants as well as plain
tiffs. Id. at 853. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1976).
It is customary in England to have separate hearings after claims are litigated
before special taxing masters in order to determine the appropriateness and size of
counsel fee awards. To prevent lengthy hearings, fees allowable are usually provided
for even down to the amount to be recovered for specific services. S. SPEISER, supra
note 2, § 12:7, at 479.
4. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 251 (1950).
5. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:3, at 467. For another explanation of the Amer
ican departure from the English rule see Note, supra note 2, at 1218 (fees provided
for by statute, but statutes not updated to keep pace with the changes in the Ameri
can monetary system).
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of counsel fee allowances as nonegalitarian caused the early Ameri
cans to reject it.
Supporters of the English rule contend, however, that the al
lowance of counsel fees stimulates arbitration and settlement. 6 Liti
gants are deterred from entering litigation with a spurious claim
because they fear that they will have to bear the burden of their
opponent's attorneys' fees in addition to their own. Further, sup
porters contend that allowing attorneys' fees encourages juries to
determine damages more accurately. When the fees are not avail
able, the juries may, as a practical matter, find it impossible to
exclude attorneys' fees from their minds in fixing compensation.
Therefore, juries may inflate damage awards in order to provide
complete compensation to an injured party. 7
Supporters of the American rule marshall convincing argu
ments on behalf of their position that neither party has an inherent
right to be awarded attorneys' fees. They point out that where
there is a risk of losing a case and being held liable for an oppo
nent's attorneys' fees, individuals may well be deterred from as
serting a right. 8 It is a well recognized premise of the American ju
dicial system that all individuals with legitimate claims should have
their day in court. 9
While the English rule may give fuller compensation, it may
also discourage the poor, in particular, from pursuing their claims.
Supporters of the American rule fear that the additional cost of
counsel fees to be borne in case of failure is a burden which the
impoverished litigant cannot shoulder.lo The American rule may
also preclude indigent clients from litigating legitimate suits. Indi
gent clients with meritorious claims may remain uncompensated in
the absence of counsel fee allowances simply because few attorneys
will be willing to represent a client who cannot pay a fee or pro
vide any guarantee that the fee will be paid. 11 There are negative
aspects to both the English and American rules but a solution to
the problem emerges from an analysis of the American rule and its
exceptions. 12
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

15 U. CIN. L. REv. 313,315 (1941).
Id.
Note, supra note 2, at 1231.
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,375 (1971).
Note, supra note 2, at 1224.
S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:8, at 481.
15 U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 315 (1941).
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ALYESKA-EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
AMERICAN RULE IN FEDERAL COURTS

Federal courts have traditionally used three grounds to sustain
attorneys' fees awards in the absence of statutory authorization.
Two grounds for equitable fee awards, the common fund and bad
faith doctrines, are still viable. The third, the private attorney gen
eral rule, has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 13
In Alyeska, the Wilderness Society, the Environmental De
fense Fund and Friends of the Earth initiated litigation to prevent
the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits for construction
of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The court of appeals approved an
award of attorneys' fees' to the groups based on the theory that
they were performing the services of private attorneys general. 14
The groups had acted on behalf of the public to vindicate impor
tant statutory rights of all citizens in seeing that the government
acted properly in issuing the pipeline permits. Attorneys' fees were
appropriate to ensure that the great cost of litigation, particularly
against well-financed defendants such as Alyeska, would not deter
private parties from enforcing the laws protecting the environment.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's decision.
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that reallocating the
expenses of litigation was a matter more appropriate for the legisla
ture to decide than for the judiciary. 15 The Court ruled, however,
that the decision did not affect the other traditional grounds of
equitable counsel fees recovery, that is, bad faith and common
fund. 16
The bad faith exception preserved in the Alyeska decision is
one of the most widely used grounds for recovering counsel fees in
the absence of statutory authorization. The federal courts have the
power to award counsel fees to a successful party when the oppo
nent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons. 17 Vaughan v. Atkinson 18 exemplifies the use of this non
statutory ground for authorization of fees. In Vaughan, a seaman
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
14. ld.
IS. ld. at 247.
16. ld. at 257-58
17. See generally Hall Y. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (discussion of bad faith, but
fees awarded under the common benefit theory).
18. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
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with tuberculosis sued the owners of a ship where he was em
ployed for not providing him with food and lodging during his ill
ness. The shipowners failed to admit or deny or even investigate
the validity of the claim. The United States Supreme Court found
that the shipowners' callous attitude in failing to investigate was
willful and persistent. 19 Their inattentiveness to the claim forced
the seaman to hire a lawyer and go to court in order to get what
was plainly owed him. The Supreme Court awarded the seaman
his counspl fees as part of the damages caused by the shipowners'
bad faith. 20
The standard of behavior necessary for a finding of "bad faith"
is not a stringent one. Courts have been willing to find "bad faith"
merely on the basis of a need for judicial assistance in securing a
clearly defined and established right. 21 Consequently, in many
cases in which fees have been sought on the basis of the private at
torney general doctrine, the plaintiffs have pleaded the existence of
"bad faith" as an alternative ground of recovery.22 The awards
based solely on bad faith, unlike those based on the private attor
ney general doctrine, are of limited help in encouraging an attor
ney to undertake a case for a client who cannot otherwise afford to
bring the action. Such awards hinge on the other party's behavior
and cannot be predicted prior to trial. 23
The Alyeska Court's decision also left intact attorneys' fees al
lowances under the common fund doctrine. Under this theory, one
who creates or protects a fund is entitled to recover attorneys' fees
out of the fund. In this manner, the expense is shared by all who
have benefitted through the creation or preservation of the fund. 24
Any existing fund, or any fund created by the litigation, may be
used to pay the attorneys' fees. Examples o'f such funds are trust
funds, escrow accounts, funds in corporate and other treasuries,
and funds in the hands of a receiver. 25 The courts have expanded
19. Id. at 530-31.
20. Id. at 531.
21. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); The Supreme Court,
1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 182 (1975); Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees
and Equal Access to the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 660 n.4 (1974); Note,
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light
to Private Litigation in Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 737 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971);
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), afI'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
23. Comment, Court-Awarded Reasonable Fees: Forcing a Segregated Public
Interest Bar?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 399,403 (1979).
24. See generally Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
25. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, §§ 11:13-20, at 416-34.
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the theory to the situation in which a common benefit has been
found but no fund exists. 26 Those who receive the "common bene
fit" are required to share in the burden of counsel fees. In Alyeska,
common fund and common benefit were lumped together under
the heading "substantial benefit."27 The Alyeska requirements for
"substantial benefit" fee awards are that the class of beneficiaries
be small and identifiable. Furthermore, the costs must be borne
directly by those who benefit.
The third equitable exception discussed in the Alyeska deci
sion is the private attorney general doctrine. This doctrine first ap
peared in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 28 Newman in
volved a successful injunction against racial discrimination at six
restaurants. The injunction was granted under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 29 The Supreme Court held that although title
II suits are brought by private citizens, the outcome serves the
public. Consequently, the plaintiff has, in effect, served as a "pri
vate attorney general." This doctrine was used extensively in civil
rights cases prior to Alyeska 30 and the passage of the Civil Rigthts At
tomey's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 31 It was often used, in addition,
in a wide range of public interest litigation. 32 The Alyeska Court,
however, struck the private attorney general doctrine in federal
question cases. Consequently, litigants seeking attorneys' fees must
now rely on the remaining equitable doctrines or statutes autho
rizing the allowance of fees. 33
26. Id. § 11:21, at 434. See also, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
392-93 (1970).
27. 421 U.S. at 264 n.39.
28. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143 (5th Cir. 1971) (litigants willing to act as private attorneys general to effectuate
the purpose of a public statute should be allowed attorneys' fees).
29. 390 U.S. at 402.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
31. See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Brandenburger v.
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
32. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Calnetics
Corp. v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (manufac
turer of automobile air conditioners acted as a private attorney general in prosecuting
a violation of the Clayton Act); La Raza Unida V. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (private citizens acting as private attorneys general in enjoining state highway
construction project where strong public policies of environmental protection and
housing assistance were at issue).
33. Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the United States: The Sover
eign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 177 (1979). In addition to
the statutory fee awards, there are a number of federal rules of court providing for
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The Court advanced several rationales for its conclusion that
counsel fees should not be awarded under the private attorney
general doctrine. The first argument relies upon the Court Costs
Statute of 1853. 34 In the majority opinion, Justice White indicated
that the statute was intended to limit recovery of costs to specified
sums. 35 Justice White explained that Congress had standardized
the costs allowable in federal litigation to avoid unfairly saddling
the losing litigant with exorbitant fees for the victor's attorney. The
manageability and fairness of awards in the absence of legislative
guidance also concerned the Court. Furthermore, the Court noted
that since the federal government has statutory immunity, the par
ties would not be able to collect attorneys' fees against the govern
ment. It also questioned the equity of allowing fees against private
parties and not against the federal government since private attor
ney general actions are often brought to enforce federal govern
ment obligations. 36
Justices Brennan and Marshall saw no basis in precedent for
holding that courts cannot award counsel fees unless the fee claim
fits squarely under a sanctioned judicial exception to the American
rule. 37 Under Justice Marshall's view, fees should be awarded
where the interests of justice require recovery.38 Justice Marshall
fee awards. See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923),
Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729, 180 N.E.2d 802 (1962) (allowance of counsel
fees in a contempt proceeding); FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (courts may impose such
conditions as seen fit); S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:47, at 524 (discretion of the
courts), § 13:3, at 621-23 (vexatious litigation), § 13:6, at 627-28 (admiralty cases),
§ 14:37, at 60-61 (civil contempt).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1976).
35. 421 U.S. at 251-53. Sections 1920 and 1923 enumerate recoverable costs.
Section 1920 includes clerk and marshall fees, court reporters, printing and copying,
and witnesses. Section 1923 provides for docket fees and costs of briefs.
36. Id. at 265-68. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412, 2413 (1976) (preclusion of
attorneys' fees as costs against the United States); Cohen, supra note 33, at 179-81
(federal common law exceptions discussed in relation to statutory fee allowances and
sovereign immunity); Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Government Defendants:
Economics Requires a New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (1979). For fee
awards against state governments, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
(eleventh amendment does not bar backpay and attorneys' fees awards since the
amendment and state sovereignty are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment). Section 5 grants Congress the authority to enforce its
provisions by appropriate legislation in a manner which would otherwise be consti
tutionally impermissible. Id.
The award in Fitzpatrick was pursuant to statute. The situation differs when the
court seeks to award fees on its own authority. The constitutional arguments in that
situation are not so readily overcome.
37. 421 U.S. at 273.
38. Id. at 272.
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attacked the majority's arguments premised on the Court Costs
Statute of 1853 and judicial manageability. The Supreme Court, ac
cording to Justice Marshall, has not used the Court Costs Statute
as a general bar to judicial fee shifting in the past. He said that ju
dicial manageability should not dissuade the Court from consider
ing these cases since there are analogous statutory and nonstatutory
fee cases which enunciate guidelines which can be applied.
Justice Marshall contended that while the majority recognizes
the continued vitality of the bad faith and common benefit excep
tions, it ignores the theory underlying them. He said that rejection
of the private attorney general concept contradicted the wide con
struction given to the common benefit exception in recent Su
preme Court cases. 39 ·Justice Marshall's opinion has received close
attention.
One commentator, for instance, indicates how little difference
actually exists between recent common benefit cases and the pri
vate attorney general concept and suggests that two different labels
describe substantially the same theory.40 This proposition brings
into question the Alyeska majority's distinction between the two.
Some courts, for instance, find a common benefit when a cause of
action is brought to vindicate a statute on behalf of the public. 41 In
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 42 a common benefit was found when
plaintiffs brought a successful suit to set aside a corporate merger
accomplished through the use of a misleading proxy statement. The
plaintiffs established the violation of the securities laws for the ben
efit of the corporation and its shareholders. The Supreme Court in
dicated the benefit conferred was the availability of "an important
means of enforcement of the proxy statute. "43 Allowance of attor
neys' fees to enforce the statute resembles the notion that the
plaintiffs are acting as private attorneys general to enforce the pub
lic interest.
Some courts, on the other hand, carefully distinguish the com
mon benefit and private attorney general theories. In District of
Columbia v. Green,44 the attorneys representing taxpayers who
prevented the collection of illegally imposed taxes sought attorneys'
39. [d. at 275.
40. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 176 (1975).
41. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (suit under the Labor Management-Relations
and Disclosure Act of 1959); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (suit
under the Securities Act of 1934).
42. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
43. [d. at 396.
44. 381 A.2d 578 (D.C. 1977).
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fees from the District of Columbia treasury. The court did not al
low attorneys' fees under the common benefit theory because the
benefitting class was not sufficiently definable. 45 The court refused
to rule that all District citizens benefitted from the vindication of
constitutional principles and were members of the injured class. 46
The court found such a ruling merges the common benefit excep
tion with the private attorney doctrine rejected by the Supreme
Court in Alyeska. 47
The result of the Alyeska decision was a drastic reduction in
the available grounds for equitable attorneys' fees awards in public
interest cases. This reduction prompted the passage of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 48 The Act authorizes
attorneys' fees in the area of civil rights. 49 The purpose of the Act
is to remedy the "anomalous gaps" in the civil rights laws created
by Alyeska, by providing federal courts the discretion to award at
torneys' fees to prevailing parties in suits brought to enforce the
Civil Rights Acts passed since 1866. 50 The problem, of course, is
that the Act's protection is limited to the area of civil rights.
Environmentalists and other public interest groups which relied on
the equitable ground for collection of counsel fees are not pro
tected under the Act unless they can fit under the narrow require
. ments of the substantial benefit or bad faith rationales or obtain
congressional authorization. Statutory authorization is, however, in
sufficient in many cases. Public interest suits may be brought un
der a statute which does not provide for attorneys' fees. Another
problem is the lack of uniformity in statutory provisions. There is
often authorization for attorneys' fees under one statute but not an
other in the same general area of law. 51 For example, in environ
45. Id. at 582 n.9.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also Skehan v. Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53,
56 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejection of common benefit exception in which the general pub
lic derived benefit from requiring public institutions to act in accordance with the
demands of due process).
48. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees' Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988.
49. Section 1988 provides for attorneys' fees in action brought to enforce § 1981
(equal rights under the law), § 1982 (property rights of citizens), § 1983 (civil action
for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), the Educa
tional Amendments to Title IX, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), the United
States Internal Revenue Code, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (employ
ment discrimination).
50. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908.
51. See Derfner, The True HAmerican Rule"; Drafting Fee Legislation in the
Public Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 251 (1979).
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mental law there are provisions for fees under the Clean Air Act, 52
but there are not provisions under the Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act. 53 It is also common for a statute to authorize fee
awards under one subsection and not under another of the same
statute. In order for Congress to respond adequately to the prob
lems created by Alyeska, each specific area of the law would have
to be examined to determine whether authorization of attorneys'
fees should be provided. 54
This hit or miss method for allowing attorneys' fees could dis
courage public interest suits. Fee awards are an extremely impor
tant element in public interest litigation. Public interest cases often
involve complex issues of law and fact which require a great deal of
preparation and expense. At the same time, the suits frequently
seek injunctive rather than monetary relief and involve clients
without adequate funds for the lengthy litigation. 55 It is possible
that the private bar could aid greatly in matters of public interest if
attorneys' fees were more freely allowed by the courts. 56 The pri
vate bar cannot accept many public interest cases when a fee award
does not exist or is insufficient to defray expenses or pay the attor
ney's customary salary. 57

III.

STATE RESPONSE TO FEDERAL REJECTION OF

THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE

The state courts must follow the federal courts and reject the
private attorney general theory when hearing a federal cause of ac
tion. 58 The states may, however, make their own decision with re
gard to the doctrine in actions brought under state law. Thus, it is
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d)(1976).
53. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(d)(1976).
54. Derfner, supra note 51, at 260-61.
55. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.D. L. REv.
301 (1973).
56. Comment, supra note 23 at 421. See also E. Cahn, Power to the People or
the Profession-The Public in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970). For
more information on the importance of attorneys' fees in specialized areas of the law
see Brown, Calculation of Attorneys' Fees: Franchise and Antitrust Relief, 2 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 297 (1979).
57. Comment, supra note 23 at 411. For more information on the reasonable
ness of attorneys' fees allowances, see Id. at 420 (attorneys' fees do not reflect fair
marketplace value of counsel services or take into account office overhead, or the
length and exclusive nature of a given case).
58. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); U.S. CON ST. art. VI (the su
premacy clause). But cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For information
on the Erie substance-procedure distinction in fee awards see Note, supra note 2,
at 1218.
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not necessary that the state courts follow the federal courts and
sound the death knell of the private attorney general. The state
courts in Massachusetts and California, for example, have adopted
opposite viewpoints on this issue.
California has chosen to retain the private attorney general
doctrine despite the United States Supreme Court's position in
Alyeska. In Serrano v. Priest,59 the Supreme Court of California
ruled in a 5-3 decision that a counsel fee award was appropriate
where state constitutional rights were being vindicated. Judgment
was reselVed on the issue of whether a statutory right's vindication
would suffice for the award. The fees in Serrano were allowed to
two public interest law firms who represented plaintiffs in a suc
cessful challenge to the California public school financing system
under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.
The California court discussed the Alyeska decision and found that
the Supreme Court recognized that the fashioning of state equita
ble exceptions was a matter left solely to the discretion of the state
courts. 60 The California court was fully aware of the criticism that
through awarding fees under equitable doctrines a judiciary vio
lates the separation of powers by usurping what some consider
solely a legislative function. The court, however, exercised its dis
cretion and retained the doctrine. The court proposed basic factors
to be considered in awarding fees under the theory to control us
age of the doctrine. These factors included the societal importance
of the public policy, the necessity for private enforcement, the
magnitude of the burden on the plaintiff, and the number of poten
tial beneficiaries. 61
Justice Richardson, dissenting in Serrano,62 found the Alyeska
rationale more persuasive than the majority position in Serrano.
Justice Richardson's concern was the California court's refusal to
rule on the viability of the private attorney general doctrine while
the Alyeska case was pending before the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the private attorney
general doctrine, yet the California majority ignored the Supreme
Court's reasoning and retained the rule. 63 Like the Court in
Alyeska, Justice Richardson was concerned with the problem of
59. 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977).
60. ld. at 43, 569 P.2d at 1312-13 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,259 n. 31. (1976».
61. ld. at 45, 569 P.2d at 1314.
62. ld. at 49,569 P.2d at 1317.
63. ld. at 51, 569 P.2d at 1318.

V.
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court involvement in policymaking and judicial manageability.64
Justice Richardson noted that there is a wide spectrum of rights ac
corded to citizens under the California Constitution. 65 The consti
tution protects such fundamental rights as life and liberty and also
such accepted freedoms as the right to fish in public waters. The
wide disparity in the importance of these rights makes it difficult
for the courts to decide which rights can be vindicated by granting
fee awards. 66
Justice Clark, also dissenting in Serrano,67 criticizes the ma
jority's decision from a separation of powers viewpoint. Justice
Clark indicated that California judges up to this point have enter
tained neither the dream nor the power to endorse social pro
grams, nor to appropriate money to fund those causes deemed de
serving. 68 He does not want the judiciary to be forced to decide
which causes are worthy enough to be supported by the award of
counsel fees. He views such policymaking as strictly a legislative
matter, not one to be usurped by court endorsement of one policy
over another.69 The California Legislature is apparently less con
cerned with judicial enforcement of social policy than is Justice
Clark. Since Serrano, the legislature has enacted a loose codifica
tion of the private attorney general doctrine. 7o The statute leaves
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
ld. at 52, 569 P.2d at 1319.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 54, 569 P. 2d at 1320.
69. ld.
70. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978):
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against
whom one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a signif
icant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the
general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial bur
den of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery,
if any.
The California Appeals Court held that § 1021.5 was a legislative declaration of attor
neys' fees policy combining elements of the substantial benefit (common fund/com
mon benefit) and private attorney general theories. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v.
City Council, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1977), vacated, 23 Cal. 3d
917, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979) (distinguishing substantial benefit and private attorney
general). But cf 381 A.2d at 586-87 (refusing to allow fees for fear of merging the
common benefit exception with the private attorney approach rejected by the
Alyeska court). See also Note, Implementation of California's Adoption of the Pri
vate Attorney General Theory and the Impact of Cal. Civ. Pro. Code sec. 1021.5:
Serrano v. Priest, 1 WHITTIER L. REv. 259, 275 (1979) (suggestion § 1021.5 intended
as limitation on the courts' ability to award attorneys' fees).
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the courts with a great deal of discretion in detennining when to
award counsel fees.
Massachusetts, in contrast to California, follows the federal
courts in rejecting the private attorney general doctrine. In Boume
wood Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrim
ination,71 an employment discrimination case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court recognized that it was not bound to follow
Alyeska in its state court proceedings. The court, however, found
the reasoning and result of Alyeska correct and concurred that
the private attorney general doctrine should be rejected. 72
Massachusetts state courts are obliged to follow the federal law
when hearing a federal cause of action. 73 The state courts have
the choice, however, when applying state law, of whatever direction
they deem best in awarding fees under the theory. Their decision,
in tum, detennines the law to be applied in diversity cases in fed
eral courts. The Supreme Court recognized in Alyeska that state
law should be followed in actions grounded on diversity when it
does not run counter to federal statute or rule of court and when it
reflects a substantial policy of the state. 74 Thus, a federal court ap
plying California law in a diversity case should follow the state law
and allow fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The
federal courts, however, hearing a Massachusetts cause of action
should follow Boumewood and reject the allowance of counsel fees
under the doctrine. 75 A problem arises when a state has not ruled
71. 371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E.2d 235 (1976). The following cases have endorsed
the Boumewood rationale. Massachusetts Elec. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978); Fuss v. Fuss, 372
Mass. 64, 368 N.E.2d 271 (1977); Broadhurst v. Director of Div. of Employment,
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2448, 369 N.E.2d 1018 (1977); Lincoln St. Realty Co. v. Green,
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1172 (1978).
72. Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination,
371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E. 2d 235, 240 (1976).
73. See notes 58 supra.
74. 421 U.S. at 259. See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. Prior to Alyeska, the First Circuit had fully recognized the private attorney
general doctrine. See Souza v. Travasino, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (inmates who
successfully challenged prison regulation limiting access of attorneys and law stu
dents properly awarded attorneys' fees); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974)
(prison inmates brought civil rights action against prison officials, attorneys' fees
were appropriate when awarded to encourage important public policy enforcement
through private attorneys general); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972)
(plaintiffs prevailed in their suit alleging unlawful racial discrimination in defen
dants refusing to lease an apartment, attorneys' fees were appropriate as plaintiffs
were seeking to vindicate a public right where damages were little compared to the
cost of Vindicating the right). For an introduction to federal court application of state
law in the area of attorneys' fees see Note, supra note 2, at 1217.
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on the doctrine's viability. The federal court must in that instance
determine what law should be appropriately applied. 76

IV. BAD FAITH AND COMMON FUND IN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN MASSACHUSETTS
The Alyeska decision preserved the "bad faith" exception to
the general rule of no counsel fee awards. 77 One commentator sug
gested that the exception is presently broader than the common
understanding of bad faith. 78 The original reasoning behind the ex
ception was primarily punitive, and the award was appropriate only
when the defendant was guilty of improper conduct. Courts have
expanded the exception, primarily in civil rights cases,79 to include
the situation in which judicial assistance is required to preserve an
established right. 80
The courts in Massachusetts, however, have statutory author
ity to award counsel fees as costs in cases in which there are insub
stantial, frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses. 81 The statute per
mits the court to make a finding of bad faith against any party to
the proceedings. 82 The statute does not provide for specific
amounts, but instead allows the court to award reasonable counsel
76. The complicated choice of law issues faced by federal courts are beyond
the scope of this comment.
77. 421 U.S. at 258-59.
78. Note, Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685, 722 (1976).
79. Id. See also Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
81. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1976).
§ 6F. Costs, expenses and interest for insubstantial, frivolous or bad faith
claims or defenses
Upon motion of any party in a civil action in which a finding, verdict,
decision, award, order or judgment has been made by a judge or justice or
by a jury, auditor, master or other finder of fact, the court may determine
after a hearing, as a separate and distinct finding, that all or substantially all
of the claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims, whether of a factual, legal
or mixed nature, made by any party who was represented by counsel during
most or all of the proceeding, were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not
advanced in good faith. The court shall include in such finding the specific
facts and reasons on which the finding is based.
If such a finding is made with respect to a party's claims, the court shall
award to each party against whom such claims were asserted an amount rep
resenting the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred
in defending against such claims. If the party against whom such claims
were asserted was not represented by counsel, the court shall award to such
party an amount representing his reasonable costs, expenses and effort in
defending against such claims ....
Id.
82. Id.
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fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending against the
frivolous and fraudulent claims. 83
The common fund or common benefit theory has achieved
wide recognition in both state and federal courts in Massa
chusetts. 84 This acceptance is consistent with the position of the
United States Supreme Court. 85 One of the earliest decisions al
lowing fees out of a fund in Massachusetts was Davis v. Bay State
League. 86 In Davis, a large number of certificate holders
benefitted from a suit brought for fraud and mismanagement
against the officers of a corporation. The court held that the
plaintiff's attorney was entitled to counsel fees out of the common
fund created and in the hands of the receiver. The allowance of
fees often occurs in cases brought to vindicate corporate stockhold
ers' rights as in the Davis decision. 87 A readily identifiable fund is
usually created in the shareholders' rights cases. When an actual
fund does not exist, courts have relied on the common benefit of
persons interested in the preservation of the same property to
award fees. 88
The First Circuit application of the common fund doctrine in
Kargman v. Sullivan 89 illustrates the value of the doctrine to plain
tiffs seeking recovery of actual expenses, including counsel fees and
other costs. In the case, the Kargmans, owners of subsidized hous
ing, sued Boston rent control officials asserting city rent control
levels conflicted with the higher rent rates allowed by the Depart
ment of Housing and Urban Development. 9o A preliminary injunc
tion was granted, but all excess rents were required to be put into
an escrow account. After the Kargmans lost the lengthy legal bat
tle, the court allowed attorneys' fees to be paid out of the escrow
fund to the attorney who intervened on behalf of several tenants in
83. Id.
84. Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2, vacated, 582 F.2d 131 (1st CiT. 1978).
85. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567
(1886); Central R.R. & B. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Green
ough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
86. 158 Mass. 434, 33 N.E. 591 (1893).
87. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Angoff v. Goldfine,
270 F.2d 185 (1st CiT. 1959); 158 Mass. at 434, 33 N.E. at 591.
88. Clark .v. Sawyer, 151 Mass. 64, 23 N.E. 726 (1890); Cobb v. Rice, 130 Mass.
235 (1881); Commonwealth v~ Mechanics Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 421 (1887);
Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 136 (1868).
89. 582 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1978).
90. Id. at 132.
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Kargman housing. 91 Although the tenant-plaintiffs were not class
representatives, their interests were identical to those of other ten
ants and their attorneys' efforts were primarily responsible for the
tenants' triumph. Without the intervenors' efforts, no fund would
have been created and no one would have benefitted. Thus, it was
equitable for all tenants profiting from the litigation to share the
cost of bringing the suit.
Certain limitations are traditionally imposed upon the common
fund or common benefit doctrine. 92 It should be exercised only in
exceptional cases which require unusual methods to bring about
substantial justice. In addition, the attorney seeking the award
bears the burden of showing the fee claim comes squarely under
the equitable principle. 93

V.

OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE

AMERICAN RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts allows counsel fees when provided for by stat
ute, rule of court, or a valid contract or stipulation. 94 In addition,
Massachusetts recognizes the common fund doctrine discussed
above and provides statutory authorization for fee awards in cases
of bad faith. Beyond these, there are a few limited and exceptional
circumstances when counsel fees may be awarded by the court.
One unusual exception occurs when the defendant is free from
fault and the plaintiff's injury stemmed solely from a third party's
bad conduct. 95 If a defendant is held responsible at law in spite of
his freedom from fault, then the fault-free defendant may sue the
third party for attorneys' fees in a separate action. A practical appli
cation of this doctrine is seen in Consolidated Hand-Method Last
ing Machine Co. v. Bradley. 96 Plaintiff in the suit seeking attor
neys' fees had been successfully sued for damages for the death of
91. Id.
92. Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Weed v. Central R.R., 100 F.
162 (5th Cir. 1900); Keyworth v. Israelson, 240 Md. 289, 214 A.2d 168 (1965); S.
SPEISER, supra note 2, § 11:9, at 410-11.
93. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Costs § 86 (1965) (limits announced by courts); Fischer v.
Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1964) (care and caution required in applying
common fund doctrine).
94. Fuss v. Fuss, 372 Mass. 64,368 N.E.2d 274 (1977).
95. Id.
96. 171 Mass. 127, 50 N.E. 464 (1898). See also Ford v. Flaherty, 364 Mass.
382, 305 N.E.2d 112 (1973); Buhl v. Viera, 328 Mass. 201, 102 N.E.2d 774 (1952).
But d. Hollywood Barbecue Co. v. Morse, 314 Mass. 368, 50 N.E.2d 55 (1943) (attor
neys' fees allowed although defendant was not totally free from fault).
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one of its employees. The present defendants, however, were actu
ally responsible for the death. Curiously, the court held that the
case fell within the rule that a master held responsible for a ser
vant's acts, without misfeasance on his part, may recover not only
the amount of the judgment against him but his reasonable ex
penses, including counsel fees. The rule does not apply where one
is defending his own wrong or his own contract, although another
may be responsible to him.
The third party bad conduct rule has specific requirements for
its application. The plaintiff in the second action must establish in
volvement in a legal dispute because of the defendant's breach of
conduct or defendant's tortious act. The attorneys' fees sought must
have been incurred in litigation with a third party, not in the suit
with the defendant from whom recovery is sought. The fees must,
in addition, be the natural and necessary consequence of the de
fendant's bad conduct since remote or uncertain consequences do
not afford a basis for recovery. 97
Another exception to the general rule occurs in tort actions for
malicious prosecution. 98 A malicious prosecution is one begun with
malice. and without probable cause with the intention of injuring
the defendant and terminating in favor of the person prosecuted. 99
In Wheeler v. Hanson,100 attorneys' fees were awarded in a mali
cious prosecution suit after an embezzlement charge. The plaintiff's
expense in procuring sureties on his bail bond and in employing
counsel were elements of the damages to which he was entitled. In
early cases there was a broad based recovery premised on the
wrongful conduct of a defendant. The plaintiff was allowed to re
cover reasonable attorney's fees as an element of damages when
the wrong was of such a character that proper protection of
plaintiff's rights required employment of counsel. 101 The courts ex
pressed fear that awards requiring only the existence of a wrong
without actual malicious prosecution ranges so far afield as to run
the risk of destroying the general rule through exception. 102
97. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 13:4, at 623.
98. See generally Stiles v. Municipal Council, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615
(1919) (tort action against council member for damages suffered by wrongful removal
of city collector, reasonable attorneys' fees were an element of damages); Wheeler v.
Hanson, 161 Mass. 370, 37 N.E. 382 (1894).
99. Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370,374,37 N.E. 382, 384 (1894).
100. Id.
101. See Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 385, 191 N.E. 661, 665 (1934) (plain
tiffs wrongly excluded from labor union, suit brought in equity against officers and
members).
102. Chartrand v. Riley, 354 Mass. 242, 237 N.E.2d 10 (1968).
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Chartrand v. Riley l03 restricts the application of the malicious
prosecution rule. The court in Chartrand denied counsel fees to an
improperly discharged registry of motor vehicles employee who
sought to recover fees incurred in a mandamus proceeding to com
pel reinstatement. The court found that the allowance of fees
where a "wrong" exists but no malicious prosecution has taken
place provides too broad a ground for recovery.104 The rule could
be extended to include any case in which the plaintiff has to seek a
remedy in the courts. Such broad application would totally circum
vent the American rule of no attorneys' fees awards. The limita
tions on counsel fees in these cases may seem harsh. Nevertheless,
many actions based on the defendant's wrongful conduct may re
ceive statutory help in Massachusetts. The statute providing for the
award of expenses, including counsel fees, for insubstantial, frivo
lous, and bad faith claims or defenses could provide counsel fees
for wronged parties in many cases. 105
VI.

CONCLUSION

Massachusetts courts generally will not allow the award of at
torneys' fees in the absence of statutory authorization. There are
certain limited exceptions to the rule. These include counsel fee al
lowances when authorized by court rule, when the court finds a
valid contract or stipulation between the parties, and when a third
party's bad conduct or a tort action for malicious prosecution is in
volved. The most successfully utilized equitable exception is the
establishment of a common fund or common benefit. It has been
particularly useful in the vindication of shareholders' rights.
Federal courts in Massachusetts, in addition to these excep
tions, may apply federal equity jurisdiction in cases involving fed
eral law. The federal bad faith exception, which is statutory in
Massachusetts, is allowed as well as the common fund or common
benefit doctrine. The private attorney general doctrine is disal
lowed under both federal and Massachusetts equitable principles.
103. Id. For additional cases denying attorneys' fees as damages where a
"wrong" exists see Saunders v. Austin W. Fishing Corp., 352 Mass. 169, 224 N.E.2d
215 (1967) (suit in equity by judgment creditor to reach and apply the proceeds of a
marine policy of liability insurance in satisfaction of the judgment); Manganaro v.
DeSanctis, 351 Mass. 107, 217 N.E.2d 760 (1966) (partners who brought a bill in eq
uity for an accounting of the partnership against a third party not entitled to attor
neys' fees); Goldberg v. Curhan, 332 Mass. 310, 124 N.E. 2d 926 (1955) (plaintiff pre
vailed in suit to enjoin false representations made by business competitor, plaintiff
not entitled to attorneys' fees incurred).
104. Chartrand v. Riley,354 Mass. 242, 243, 237 N.E.2d 10, 11 (1968).
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1976).
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The Alyeska decision dealt a devastating blow to public inter
est litigation by disallowing counsel fees under the private attorney
general doctrine. Congressional enactment of the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 aids those vindicating civil rights, but other
public interest groups have suffered. There are few groups suffi
ciently funded to bear the cost of lengthy litigation against a well
financed defendant. It is doubtful the private bar will take up the
cause of these groups without adequate economic rewards. Al
though the current legislative counsel fee awards aid in some cases,
there are still many areas which do not receive statutory help. Al
lowance of attorneys' fees for suits brought in the public interest
would be one method of assuring equal enforcement of all policies
of value to all citizens. The negative reaction to court as opposed to
legislative endorsement of selected policies evinces too little confi
dence in our judiciary. Judges are involved everyday in the balanc
ing of delicate and important interests. Enforcement of the public
interest requires the flexibility of court awarded attorneys' fees.
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